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In a world of some two hundred countries, only a relatively few
–mainly members of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development– can be identified as “winners”, that is to
say, countries with high and sustained annual per capita in-
comes in the order of US$ 20,000. Among other factors, some
of the principal features of winner countries are that: i) they
have been through an intense industrialization process, ii) they
have projected that process into the international economy in
the form of exports of manufactures, and iii) the leading na-
tional companies which have exported manufactures have been
transformed into transnational corporations (TNCs) in the proc-
ess. Many developing Asian countries have used the apparel
industry as a springboard to deepen their industrialization proc-
ess, especially by becoming suppliers of “full packages” to in-
ternational buyers, involving the complete manufacture of
apparel according to the designs provided by their international
clients. For many Caribbean Basin countries, apparel exports
represent their principal link with the international economy. In
this case, however, since those exports stem from a low wage-
export processing zone-special access package designed to help
United States apparel TNCs to compete better in their home
market against Asian imports, they do not produce the desired
developmental results in the Caribbean. The United States ap-
parel TNCs employ only those factors that allow them to im-
prove the efficiency of their international system of integrated
production, which are essentially the low wages paid in the case
of the Caribbean Basin. Consequently, instead of deepening the
local industrialization process, they truncate it. The exports do
not represent the external projection of the local industrializa-
tion process, but merely the assembly of imported components.
The local apparel companies are not internationalized in the
process, but instead have their very existence threatened. Thus,
as part of a developmental trajectory, these activities have worn
threadbare and need replacement by something better.







A stylized history of the
economic growth of countries
In a world of some two hundred countries, it can be
argued that only about ten or fifteen per cent of them
–basically the members of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD)– can be
considered to have “made it” in terms of growth and
development. They have done so in the sense that
they have enjoyed sustained economic growth over
many decades, if not centuries, that has allowed them
to reach a significant level of per capita income (say,
US$ 20,000 a year).1 Figure 1 captures this notion in
terms of the “winners’ circle” of prominent examples
of such successful countries.
The remarkable rise of some nations –in terms of
their growth and development– began with the Indus-
trial Revolution in England. It may be noted that the
original winners (such as the United Kingdom and
the United States) advanced at relatively low annual
rates of growth (2% or less) over centuries to reach a
level of sustained per capita income that placed them
in the winners’ circle. Relative latecomers from the
old world, like France and Germany, achieved that
same goal in less time by growing at a faster rate
(about 2.5% a year). Japan, the first of the Asian
nations to achieve winners’ status, advanced at about
double the rate of the original Anglo-Saxon winners.
Other European countries, like Italy and Spain, ex-
ceeded the Japanese rate of growth by 50%. East
Asian newly industrializing countries (NICs) (such as
South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) are outdoing
even these speedsters (5.5% a year) in approaching
their targeted  income levels, and China, while far
from the goal, is advancing at an even faster rate
(7.5% a year). Within this small group of prominent
countries in, or approaching, the winners’ circle, late-
comers have been able to outperform their predeces-
sors, “making it” in less time by increasing their per
capita income at a quicker pace.
What explains the success of these winners?
There are undoubtedly numerous factors that influ-
ence this outcome, but the three central factors taken
into account here are:
i) an intense process of industrialization;
ii) the extension of that process to the interna-
tional market in the form of exports of manufactures;
iii) the creation of national leader companies that
develop into world-class global competitors.
A glance at any of the countries in the winners’
circle immediately brings to mind some of the princi-
pal aspects of their original industrial specialization,
the nature of their success in exporting manufactures,
and even the names of some of their national champi-
ons operating in the international market. Examples
of the latter range from United States electrical ma-
chinery producers (General Electric and Westing-
house), automobile makers (General Motors and Ford),
and computer companies (IBM and Microsoft), to
Japanese consumer electronics companies (Matsushita,
Sony and Toshiba) and automobile makers (Toyota,
Nissan and Honda), and to newcomers  from East
Asian NICs in the areas of computers (Acer, Hyundai),
consumer electronics (Samsung, LG) and motor vehicles
(Hyundai, Kia, Daewoo), to name but a few.
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1 This argument has been developed in much greater detail in
Mortimore, 1997.






The Winners’ Circle: a stylized history of the
economic growth of nations






















Source: based on Ramos, J., “Industrial Policy and Competitiveness in Open Economies”, CEPAL Review , No. 34, September, 1996
FIGURE 1
The Winners’ Circle: a stylized history of the
economic growth of nations
Source: Based on Ramos, J., “Industrial Policy and Competi-
tivenes in Open Economices”, CEPAL Review, No. 34, Septem-
ber, 1996.
II
Apparel as a motor of growth
The apparel industry was an important manufacturing
activity and responsible for part of the success of the
winner countries’ industrialization processes. Indeed,
vestiges of that industry can still be encountered in
the export profile of those countries. Table 1 shows
the 50 most important supplier countries of apparel to
the OECD market by import market share during
1980-1995, based on the CAN computer programme
developed by ECLAC.2 It is an activity of declining
importance in these economies as their industrializa-
tion processes move into more technologically  so-
phisticated activities, but even so many winner
countries are still formidable apparel exporters. Italy
is the second most important supplier (even though
its OECD market share dropped from 12.89% to
7.88% between 1980 and 1995). Germany is fourth
(declining from  6.93% to 3.87%), while France is
eighth (from 5.37% to 2.74%). The UK is twelfth
(from 4.12% to 2.24%) and the United States is fif-
teenth (from 2.04% to 1.76%). With the exception of
Italy, which has specialized more in high fashion (ap-
parel still accounts for a significant proportion of its
total exports to the OECD – 7.3% in 1995), apparel
represented less than 2% of the exports of the other
winner countries in 1995. This industry was a motor
of growth in the early phases of industrialization.
The apparel industry has been a central element
of the export success of the East Asian NICs (espe-
cially Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea) and the
impressive advances of the new Asian Tigers (in par-
ticular Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Ma-
laysia) and China. Three of the East Asian NICs are
among the top  ten apparel suppliers of the OECD:
Hong Kong is ranked third (even though its import
market share fell from 13.72% to 7.28% during 1980-
1995), South Korea is fifth (from 9.13% to 3.82%)
and Taiwan is in tenth spot (from 6.62% to 2.45%).
Except in Hong Kong, where apparel continued to
account for more than one-third of total exports (con-
sisting in part of transshipments from China), the im-
portance of apparel in the overall exports of other
NICs, such as Korea (dropping from 25.8% to 9.1% of
total exports) and Taiwan (15.4% to 5.3%), declined
between 1980 and 1995.
The opposite was taking place in the case of the
new  Asian  Tigers and China in that period. They
were becoming more important apparel suppliers and
the proportion of apparel in total exports was rising
sharply. China, of course, is the new global force in
the apparel industry, ranking first with an OECD im-
port market share of 17.57% in 1995 (up from 2.74%
in 1980). The share of apparel in China’s exports to
the OECD rose from 10.5% to 20.4%. The new Asian
Tigers have also made their presence felt. Indonesia
ranks eleventh (with its OECD import market share for
apparel  rising from  0.21%  to 2.39%), Thailand is
thirteenth (from 0.66% to 2%), the Philippines is in
sixteenth spot (from 1.41% to 1.68%) and Malaysia
is in seventeenth place (rising from 0.48% to 1.66%).
The importance of apparel exports in total exports to
the OECD has risen substantially for all these coun-
tries.
Clearly, the apparel industry has been an impor-
tant stepping stone for winner countries to get their
industrialization processes rolling and to generate
solid export streams to the international market. Be-
tween 1980 and 1995 the importance of apparel (SITC
84) in the total imports of the OECD rose from 2% to
about 3.5% placing it among the more dynamic in-
dustries in international trade. Moreover, the import
market share of countries other than OECD ones
jumped from 49.3% to 67.3% of the total. A good
part of that dynamism stemmed from the relocation
of apparel production, especially to developing coun-
tries, rather than from surges in world demand for
apparel products (see Audet, 1996; ILO, 1996, and
van Liemt, 1994).
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2 The “Competitive Analysis of Nations” (CAN) computer pro-
gramme of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) measures the international
competitiveness of countries in terms of import market shares (at
three digits of the Standard  International Trade Classification
(SITC, Rev.2)) in five main  markets (OECD,  Western Europe,
North America, Japan, and Latin America). A DOS version on
diskettes or a Windows 95 version on CD-ROM can be purchased
from ECLAC (contact wperes@eclac.cl).
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TABLE 1
The 50 main supplier countries of apparel
(SITC 84) for the OECD market, 1980-1995
Share of OECD market a Apparel as % of country’s total exports
Country
1980 1995 % change 1980 1995 % change
1 China 2.74 17.57 540.64 10.52 20.36 93.63
2 Italy 12.89 7.88 -38.87 8.17 7.25 -11.27
3 Hong Kong 13.72 7.28 -46.90 37.53 35.56 -5.25
4 Germany 6.93 3.87 -44.19 1.78 1.50 -15.35
5 South Korea 9.13 3.82 -58.20 25.82 9.08 -64.84
6 Turkey 0.36 3.73 925.75 5.97 37.63 530.43
7 India 2.09 3.32 58.79 13.60 22.67 66.66
8 France 5.37 2.74 -48.90 2.45 1.86 -24.27
9 Portugal 1.72 2.56 49.16 16.25 19.21 18.24
10 Taiwan b 6.62 2.45 -62.95 15.44 5.27 -65.85
11 Indonesia 0.21 2.39 1 060.49 0.35 10.51 2 862.06
12 United Kingdom 4.12 2.24 -45.59 1.98 1.80 -9.06
13 Thailand 0.66 2.00 202.20 5.66 8.60 51.85
14 Mexico 0.77 1.85 139.21 1.59 3.76 136.82
15 United States 2.04 1.76 -13.75 0.50 0.71 42.25
16 Philippines 1.41 1.68 19.01 9.17 17.14 86.99
17 Malaysia 0.48 1.66 244.06 1.86 5.79 210.85
18 Tunisia 1.00 1.64 65.01 20.05 51.30 155.87
19 Poland 0.80 1.59 97.94 5.75 13.89 141.72
20 Morocco 0.37 1.56 324.76 6.30 37.13 489.29
21 Netherlands 1.79 1.34 -25.12 1.05 1.39 33.18
22 Dominican Republic 0.28 1.31 369.15 9.17 46.52 407.43
23 Pakistan 0.24 1.18 397.88 7.41 33.08 346.22
24 Belgium/Luxembourg 2.30 1.14 -50.40 1.63 1.39 -14.75
25 Greece 2.73 1.07 -60.68 24.25 21.65 -10.75
26 Romania 1.01 0.92 -8.84 10.50 27.00 157.10
27 Hungary 0.98 0.76 -21.70 12.65 10.62 -16.06
28 Canada 0.45 0.68 49.90 0.26 0.54 105.56
29 Austria 1.60 0.66 -58.99 4.59 2.39 -47.83
30 Honduras 0.04 0.62 1 445.69 1.66 44.08 2 557.47
31 Spain 0.77 0.61 -20.63 1.83 1.26 -31.12
32 Denmark 0.95 0.59 -38.09 2.43 2.47 1.70
33 Costa Rica 0.12 0.58 384.03 4.65 24.49 426.57
34 Singapore 1.01 0.52 -49.06 5.12 1.81 -64.63
35 Guatemala 0.01 0.51 3 649.02 0.47 32.54 6 844.42
36 Israel 0.71 0.50 -29.62 6.20 5.01 -19.14
37 Jamaica 0.04 0.41 861.60 1.71 34.03 1 892.24
38 Ireland 0.61 0.41 -32.50 2.81 1.68 -40.07
39 El Salvador 0.06 0.39 539.53 2.33 46.16 1 882.51
40 Switzerland 0.82 0.38 -53.87 1.05 0.78 -25.90
41 Colombia 0.10 0.31 204.37 1.05 5.71 443.16
42 Egypt 0.04 0.30 631.87 0.34 9.72 2 799.81
43 Bulgaria 0.17 0.27 53.71 6.96 13.38 92.24
44 Japan 1.11 0.21 -81.25 0.59 0.13 -78.76
45 Brazil 0.25 0.21 -16.27 0.63 0.96 53.79
46 South Africa 0.13 0.17 33.56 0.36 1.55 329.95
47 Peru 0.03 0.14 330.53 0.42 6.40 1 439.67
48 Sweden 0.61 0.14 -77.24 0.86 0.33 -61.39
49 Finland 1.63 0.13 -92.23 5.53 0.66 -88.14
50 Australia 0.04 0.10 140.89 0.10 0.51 436.62
Total 94.05 90.14
Source: Lall and Mortimore, 1997.
a Export values for 1980 are three-year averages; for 1995, two-year averages.
b Taiwan’s exports were calculated as residual after other exports were taken into account. The CAN database does not include some large
apparel exporters such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Mauritius, each of which exports around US$ 1.5 to 2 billion of garments per year,
about the same level as Morocco.
III
The situation of small countries
Small countries face an especially difficult task in
making it to the winners’ circle. In scale-based indus-
tries, for example, they have difficulty in reaching
minimum efficient economic scales of production.
They cannot rely on a sufficiently large domestic
market –one that will allow them to reach the re-
quired levels of production efficiency– in order to
develop the kind of operations that will permit them
to venture into the international market with the aim
of becoming significant competitors. They often start
off their industrialization processes in simpler, more
labour-intensive industries, such as apparel, and look
to trade agreements or economic integration initiatives
to expand their markets in order to sustain their industri-
alization processes and to permit national leader com-
panies to arise and evolve into world players.
This is by no means a trivial observation. Small
countries are increasingly becoming the norm in to-
day’s world. Eighty-seven countries have populations
under five million, 58 have fewer than 2.5 million,
and 35 have fewer than 0.5 million. Measured in an-
other way, half of the countries of the world have a
smaller population  than  the  United States state of
Massachusetts (The Economist, 1998).
The Caribbean Basin is a case in point. Six of the
small countries of the Caribbean Basin are among the
fifty main suppliers of apparel to the OECD. These
small countries have  import market shares of less
than 1% each, except for the Dominican Republic,
which has more. All are making dramatic advances.
The Dominican Republic is in 22nd position (increas-
ing its share from 0.28% to 1.31% between 1980 and
1995), Honduras is in 30th place (from 0.04% to
0.62%), Costa Rica reached the 33rd spot (from 0.12%
to 0.58%), Guatemala is in 35th position (0.01% to
0.51%), Jamaica reached the 37th spot (from 0.04% to
0.41%), and El Salvador is in 39th place (from 0.06%
to 0.39%). In all cases, apparel accounts for between
one-quarter (Costa Rica) and about one-half (Do-
minican Republic, Honduras and El Salvador) of
their total exports to the OECD. The apparel industry
represents their principal export link with the interna-
tional economy. However, as we shall see, this is a
very peculiar link in the case of the Caribbean Basin.
Significant changes are taking place in the sour-
cing of OECD imports of apparel. In general, the ma-
jor “winner” countries of North America and Europe
are losing market shares to Asian challengers, but
even within Asia, the new major challengers, such as
China and the new Asian Tigers, are displacing
the East Asian NICs as the sources of such exports
(figure 2). Other significant developing country chal-
lengers are to be found on the European rim (Turkey,
Morocco and Tunisia) and in Latin America (Mexico
and the Dominican Republic). As figure 2 suggests,
the effect of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment is to integrate the Mexican industry into the
North American one. Apart from Mexico and the
Caribbean Basin countries, no other major apparel
exporters are found in Latin America.
Except for the dominant Asian suppliers, which
are present in all major markets, a very significant
regional aspect may be observed in the supply of ap-
parel to the OECD. Figure 3 shows that in the North
American market (the United States plus Canada),
there are two major apparel-supplying groups of de-
veloping countries: those of Asia and those of Latin
America (especially Mexico and the Caribbean Ba-
sin). China is the principal supplier, followed by
Hong Kong, Korea and Mexico. The next level of
suppliers are  basically Asian (Indonesia, Thailand,
Malaysia, the Philippines and India) but also include
the Dominican Republic. The outer ring of more mi-
nor but rising suppliers consists almost exclusively of
Caribbean Basin countries (such as Jamaica, Hondu-
ras, Costa Rica, Guatemala and El Salvador), though
it also includes Turkey. Latin America is a significant
and growing apparel supplier for the North American
market.
Other  major markets also display regional as-
pects. In the Western European market the principal
developing country suppliers are China, Hong Kong
and Turkey. The next level of suppliers come mainly
from the European rim (Tunisia, Morocco and Po-
land) but also include India. The following group of
suppliers is a mixture of European rim and Asian
suppliers. Latin American and especially Caribbean
Basin suppliers are completely absent. The European
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rim represents an important and growing supplier
base for the Western European market, similar to the
relationship between the North American market and
its Caribbean Basin suppliers. The Japanese market is
supplied basically by a single source country: China.
South Korea represents the second most important
developing country source of apparel. The next level
of developing country suppliers consists of Hong
Kong,  Thailand, Indonesia and, to a lesser extent,
Taiwan. The Japanese market is supplied almost ex-
clusively by other Asian countries; the major suppli-
ers from both the European rim and the Caribbean
Basin are totally absent.
In other words, there are two predominant reali-
ties in the supply of apparel to the countries making
up  the OECD market. On the one hand, the Asian
countries, led by China, the East Asian NICs and the
new  Asian  Tigers, have  impressive import market
shares in all the major elements of the OECD market:
North America, Western Europe and Japan. On the
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.
Note: The 1994-5 position corresponds to the ring where the country’s name is located; the 1979-81 position,
if different is indicated by a circle. The arrows represent the magnitude and direction of change over time. This
manner of presenting the relative shifts, using a different data base, first appeared in Gereffi’s article in Bobbin.





Figure 2: Shifts in the Regional Structure of OECD












































The rings indicate the share of total OECD imports in U.S. dollars by partner
country:
1. >50% 2. 10- 49.9% 3. 5- 9.9% 4. 2- 4.9% 5. 1- 1.9%
Annual average total value of OECD apparel imports was$29.4 billion in 1979-81







Shifts in the regional structure of OECD
(25 countries) apparel imports from 1980 to 1995 a b
Source: Calculated using the CANPLUS computer programme of UN-ECLAC.
a The rings indicate the share of total OECD imports in United Stat s dollars by partner country: 1) > 50%; 2) 10-49.9%; 3) 5-9.9%;
4) 2-4.9%; 5) 1-3.9%. Annual average total value of OECD apparel imports was US$ 29.4 billion in 1979-1981 and US$ 120.5 billion in
1994-1995. A minor amount of double counting took place.
b The 1994-1995 position corresponds to the ring where the country’s name is located; the 1979-1981 position, if different, is indicated by a
circle.  The arrows represent the magnitude and direction of change over time.  This manner of p esenting the relative shifts, using a different
data base, first appeared in Gereffi (1997).
other hand, significant and growing import market
shares are observed in the case of Mexico and the
Caribbean Basin, in the North American market, and
the European rim countries, in the Western European
market. The Caribbean Basin plays a significant sup-
plier role only in the North American market.
The examples of the Dominican Republic and
Costa Rica illustrate this point. Tables 2 and 3 pro-
vide the relevant information on the competitive situ-
ation of these countries in the North American
market. Table 2 indicates that the Dominican Repub-
lic has significantly increased its overall share of im-
ports by that market (from 0.28% to 0.38% during
1980-1995). That improvement was concentrated in
manufactures (0.13% to 0.40%), because in both
natural resource-based products (0.45% to 0.31%) and
“others” (0.82% to 0.38%) the Dominican Republic
suffered a contraction in its shares of imports by that
market. During the 1980-1995 period the structure of
Dominican exports to that market was transformed
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Figure 3:  Shifts in the Regional Structure of North American













The rings indicate the share of total North American.imports in U.S. dollars by partner
country:     1. 50%+ 2. 10-49.9%      3. 5-9.9%      4. 2-4.9%      5. 1-1.9%
Total value of North American apparel imports was $7.9 billion in 1979-81 and $42.8
billion in 1994-5
Note: The 1994-5 position corresponds to the ring where the country’s name is located; the 1979-81 position, if
different is indicated by a circle. Thearrows represent the magnitude and direction of change over time.








































Shifts in the regional structure of North American
(United States and Canada) apparel imports during 1980-1995 ab
Source: Calculated using the CANPLUS computer program of UN-ECLAC.
a The rings indicate the share of total North American imports in United States dollars by partner country: 1) > 50%; 2) 10-49.9%; 3) 5-9.9%;
4) 4-4.9%; 5) 1- 3.9%. Total value of North American apparel imports was US$ 7.9 billion in 1979- 981 and US$ 42.8 billion in 1994-1995.
b The 1994-1995 position corresponds to the ring where the country’s name is located; the 1979-1981 position, if different, is indicated by a
circle. The arrows represent the magnitude and direction of change over time.
from natural resource-based (65.5% of total exports
in 1980) to manufactures-based (84.2% of the total in
1995). Manufactures not based on natural resources
became the strong suit in the Dominican export rep-
ertoire, accounting for three-quarters (74.8%) of all
exports to the North American market in 1995. Al-
most three-quarters (73.6%) of  Dominican exports
were concentrated in just 10 product groups at the
three-digit level of SITC-Rev.2 in 1995. The Domini-
can Republic was gaining market share in nine of
those ten groups, and seven of the products corre-
sponded to the group of the fifty most dynamic items
in the North American market. Half of these principal
export items pertain to the apparel industry and their
share increased from 10.5% of total exports in 1980
to 48.7% in 1995. Without doubt, the apparel indus-
try is by far the principal link between the Dominican
and the North American markets and should there-
fore represent the extension of the national industri-
alization process into the international market.
Table 3 presents similar information for Costa
Rica, which also improved its import market share in
the North American market (from 0.15% to 0.23%
between 1980 and 1995). This improvement was cen-
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TABLE 2
Dominican Republic: Aspects of its international
competitiveness in the North American market
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Share of the North American import market 0.28 0.25 0.31 0.38
Natural resources a+b+c 0.45 0.50 0.32 0.31
Agriculture a 1.66 1.31 0.83 0.68
Energy b - - - -
Textile fibres, minerals, etc. c 0.35 0.04 0.09 0.07
Manufactures d+e 0.13 0.14 0.29 0.40
Based on natural resources d 0.55 0.49 0.86 0.91
Not based on natural resources e 0.09 0.12 0.26 0.37
Others f 0.82 0.99 0.59 0.38
II. Contribution (export structure of Dominican Republic
in this market) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a+b+c 65.5 46.0 20.8 12.5
Agriculture a 62.5 45.8 20.4 12.3
Energy b - - - -
Textile fibres, minerals, etc. c 3.0 0.2 0.4 0.2
Manufactures d+e 26.5 41.2 72.9 84.2
Based on natural resources d 9.6 8.1 11.4 9.4
Not based on natural resources e 16.9 33.0 61.5 74.8
Others f 7.9 12.8 6.3 3.3
III. 10 main exports of Dominican Republic to this market g h 44.8 46.1 66.1 73.6
842 Outer garments, men’s and boys’, of textile fabrics * + 1.1 5.4 13.5 17.4
846 Undergarments, knitted * + 4.6 5.6 8.2 12.5
843 Outer garments, women’s and girls’, of textile fabrics
or crocheted * + 2.2 5.8 10.2 10.7
612 Manufactures of leather, parts of footwear, etc. + 1.2 3.4 6.3 6.5
872 Medical instruments and appliances, n.e.s. + 0.2 - 4.3 6.5
845 Outer garments, other articles, knitted/crocheted * + 0.7 0.9 4.7 5.5
772 Electrical apparatus for making and breaking elec. circuits * + 0.7 1.3 3.9 4.1
061 Sugar and honey - 32.3 17.8 7.2 4.0
897 Jewellery, goldsmiths’ and silversmiths’ wares, etc. * + 0.1 3.7 4.8 3.8
844 Undergarments, textile fabrics (not knitted/crocheted) * + 1.9 2.2 3.0 2.6
a Sections 0, 1 and 4 ; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev2).
b Section 3.
c Divisions 26, 27 and 28.
d Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
e Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in d), 7 and 8.
f Section 9.
g Groups which correspond to the 50 most dynamic ones (*) in this market during 1980-1995.
h Groups in which the market share increased (+) or decreased (-) during 1980-1995.
tered on both agricultural products (0.31% to 0.61%)
and manufactures (0.03% to 0.16%). During this pe-
riod, the export structure of Costa Rica was trans-
formed from one heavily based on natural resources
(85.2%  of total exports in 1980) to one in which
manufactures came to represent the larger part
(56.6% in 1995). Manufactures not based on natural
resources accounted for 55.5% of all exports to North
America in that year. Three-quarters of Costa Rica’s
total exports correspond to products in the top ten,
and half of those export items are from the apparel
industry, which  accounts for five  of the six items
among the 50  most  dynamic North American im-
ports. The share of apparel in Costa Rica’s total ex-
ports to the North American market jumped substan-
tially (from 8.7% in 1980 to 36.3% in 1995). Costa
Rica gained market share in nine of these ten items.
Again, apparel  was the principal link between the
Costa Rican and North American markets and pre-
sumably represented the extension of the Costa Rican
industrialization process into the international mar-
ket.
These countries are representative of the general
situation in the Caribbean Basin: small countries
which have, to different degrees, wagered on the ap-
parel segment of the North American market. Their
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TABLE 3
Costa Rica: Aspects of its international competitiveness
in the North American market
1980 1985 1990 1995
I. Share of North American import market 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.23
Natural resources a+b+c 0.31 0.45 0.48 0.61
Agriculture a 1.20 1.17 1.25 1.36
Energy b - 0.01 - -
Textile fibres, minerals, etc. c 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04
Manufactures d+e 0.03 0.06 0.12 0.16
Based on natural resources d 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06
Not based on natural resources e 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.16
Others f 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.11
II. Contribution (export structure of Costa Rica
in this market) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Natural resources a+b+c 85.2 71.0 49.6 41.8
Agriculture a 84.8 70.1 49.5 41.6
Energy b - 0.5 - -
Textile fibres, minerals, etc. c 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.2
Manufactures d+e 13.5 28.1 49.1 56.6
Based on natural resources d 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.1
Not based on natural resources e 12.5 27.0 47.7 55.5
Others f 1.3 0.8 1.3 1.6
III. 10 main exports of Costa Rica to this market g h 78.4 74.0 73.0 72.6
057 Fruit and nuts (not oil nuts), fresh or dried + 34.4 34.1 27.2 24.3
846 Undergarments, knitted or crocheted * + 5.2 5.0 9.9 12.6
842 Outer garments, men’s and boys’, of textile fabrics * + 0.5 3.7 9.7 11.6
844 Undergarments, textile fabrics (not knitted/crocheted) * + 0.1 2.0 2.9 4.6
071 Coffee and coffee substitutes + 17.6 12.5 6.0 4.1
845 Outer garments, other articles, knitted/crocheted * + 0.3 0.6 3.1 4.0
843 Outer garments, women’s and girls’, of textile fabrics * + 2.6 5.4 6.8 3.5
897 Jewellery, goldsmiths’ and silversmiths’ wares, etc. * + - 0.4 1.2 2.7
011 Meat and edible meat offals, fresh, chilled or frozen - 17.0 9.3 4.7 2.6
054 Vegetables, fresh, chilled, frozen or simply preserved + 0.8 1.0 1.6 2.5
a Sections 0, 1 and 4; divisions 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 29 of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC Rev2).
b Section 3.
c Divisions 26, 27 and 28.
d Divisions 61, 63 and 68; groups 661, 662, 663, 667 and 671.
e Sections 5, 6 (minus the divisions and groups mentioned in d), 7 and 8.
f Section 9.
g Groups which correspond to the 50 most dynamic ones (*) in this market during 1980-1995.
h Groups in which the market share increased (+) or decreased (-) during 1980-1995
apparel exports go solely to that market, suggesting
that either they are not plentiful enough to be spread
around or they are not competitive enough to enter
other markets. As we shall see, the manner in which
these countries supply the North American market
determines to a large extent the impact that the ap-
parel industry has on the growth and development
trajectories of the Caribbean Basin countries.
IV
The North American apparel connection
Gereffi (1997) has demonstrated that the nature of the
apparel marketing chain has changed considerably
over time. Buyer-driven chains have progressively
supplanted producer-driven chains: that is to say,
companies that buy apparel (usually by contracting
out fashion articles of their own design) for sale to
their up-market clientele are increasingly calling the
shots in the United States industry compared to com-
panies that produce standard clothing for distribution
to retailers. In the United States market, large retail
stores (such as Sears, Wal-Mart, J.C. Penney, K-Mart,
etc.) and branded marketers (such as Liz Claiborne,
Donna Karan, Polo, Tommy Hilfiger, Nike, etc.)
have come to possess greater influence over the
whole chain itself (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (eds.),
1994, pp. 95-122).
As was also suggested by Gereffi (1997, pp. 16-31),
this evolution allowed “full package” suppliers from
developing  countries in  East Asia (i.e., those who
provide the complete article required by the buyers)
to  play a more  important role, cutting the United
States clothing producers out of the relationship. This
strengthened the position of the East Asian domestic
companies capable of organizing the complete pro-
duction of the article, and such companies capable of
providing all the organization necessary to convert
retailers’ or branded marketers’ designs into finished
products which met the buyers’ required volumes on
time as well as fulfilling their quality standards be-
came significant competitive forces in the apparel in-
dustry, particularly in women’s wear. Moreover, they
also provide a strong boost to the national growth and
development trajectory.
East Asian full package suppliers from Taiwan,
Hong Kong and South Korea did this by establishing
their own regional production systems which organ-
ized integrated production from textiles and cloth
through the apparel assembly process to final deliv-
ery to the retailers or branded marketers. Some even
developed into international competitors of their
original clients. This gave a significant impulse to
their domestic economies. Although these countries
appear to be losing import market shares in the OECD
market, in fact, their apparel companies often export
their products from overseas factories that assemble
components from the home country of the Asian
manufacturers/traders, so that although their market
shares in final markets for direct apparel exports de-
cline, their exports of textile and cloth inputs to off-
shore assembly sites (such as China, Thailand,
Indonesia, etc.) rise. Thus, in Asia, full package sup-
pliers in Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong have
developed their own networks of assembly operations
in other parts of Asia, where full package suppliers and
simple assembly operations for export coexist.
The situation  is considerably  different for ap-
parel production in Latin America (essentially Mex-
ico and the Caribbean Basin). The apparel companies
operating  there tend to be subsidiaries of branded
manufacturers (especially for women’s underwear) or
foreign or national companies which compete for in-
bond assembly contracts (mostly for men’s outer-
wear) from the overseas buyers of the large United
States retailers and which do not provide full package
services. In this case, full package suppliers have not
arisen because the competitive advantages stem
strictly from locating the final assembly stage in
those countries, primarily in order to take advantage
of lower wages. The overseas buyers, or the branded
manufacturers themselves, handle all the other as-
pects of the package. Thus, simplifying somewhat,
one can distinguish two different realities in the ap-
parel industry of developing country suppliers of the
OECD market. One is an Asian version in which local
companies of the East Asian NICs act as full package
suppliers (mostly of women’s wear) to large retailers
and branded marketers. The other is a Latin Ameri-
can version which isolates the assembly process in
C E P A L R E V I E W 6 7 • A P R I L 1 9 9 9128
APPAREL-BASED INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN: A THREADBARE GARMENT?  MICHAEL MORTIMORE
those countries, mainly for the supply of women’s
underwear through subsidiaries of branded manufac-
turers or of men’s outerwear via foreign or national
subcontractors to overseas buyers. The Asian “full
package” manufacturer/trader version is in stark con-
trast with what could be called the Caribbean Basin
“special access-export processing zone-low wage”
version. These differences are of central importance
for defining the local impact  in terms of national
growth and development.
The North American apparel connection has
been responsible for the huge increase in apparel ex-
ports from  Latin America. Textile and apparel ex-
ports from Latin America to the United States market
grew from US$3.4 billion (12% of total United States
imports of such) in 1990 to US$14.5 billion (27%) in
1997 (14.2% originated in the Caribbean Basin and
11% came from Mexico during 1997).3 Latin Ameri-
can countries were gaining ground as apparel suppli-
ers to the United States market, but they were doing
so in a very different way from their East Asian com-
petitors.
The original Mexico/Caribbean Basin variant4 was
considered to have special access because it rested
heavily on the so-called “production sharing” mecha-
nism of the United States tariff code. This HTS 9802
provision allows United States-sourced apparel inputs
to be assembled offshore, paying tax upon re-entry
into  the United  States market  solely on the value
added (mainly wages) outside the country. The share
of United States textile and clothing imports made
under this scheme has risen from US$1.4 billion
(6% of all such imports) in 1987 to US$8.9 billion
(21%) in 1997. Mexico (37% of the apparel imports
via HTS 9802) and the Caribbean Basin (56% of such
imports) together provide over 90% of textile and
apparel imports into the United States via this mecha-
nism (United States International Trade Commission,
1997a). In sharp contrast with the Asian countries, a
very substantial proportion of all Latin American ex-
ports to the United States entered under the HTS 9802
mechanism in 1996: Mexico (37.6%), Dominican Re-
public (58.7%), Costa Rica (35.4%), Honduras
(54.6%), Guatemala (34.2%), El Salvador (62.1%)
and Jamaica (53.6%). It is in this sense that one can
speak of “special access” for apparel from Mexico
and the Caribbean Basin.
These Latin American countries also made in-
creasing use of export processing zones (EPZs) to give
incentives to the assembly trade related to the HTS 9802
mechanism. Between 1980 and 1992, for example,
the importance of EPZ operations in total exports rose
from 11% to 68% in the case of the Dominican Re-
public, from 16% to 41% for Mexico, and from virtu-
ally nothing to 21% in Costa Rica (Willmore, 1996).
The EPZs provide total tax exemption for imports of
inputs and components and exports of final products,
and total or temporary exemption from income, profit
and profit remittance taxes. Complementary aspects
include the provision of facilities in terms of foreign
exchange operations, limited access to the domestic
market and expedite customs service. The EPZ facili-
ties and tax exemptions represent the national counter-
part to the United States HTS 9802 mechanism
intended to provide additional incentives for United
States-based apparel firms to make use of assembly
operations in the Caribbean Basin and Mexico.
The third element of the original Latin American
variant of apparel exports to the United States market
rested on low labour costs. Figure 4, for example,
shows that after the massive devaluation of the na-
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3 Figures from United States International Trade Commission,
1998.
4 Since the inception of the North American Free Trade Area in
1994 the first signs of full package suppliers, mostly United
States companies, have appeared in Mexico.  See  Gereffi  and
Bair (1998), pp. 26-35.
FIGURE 4
Dominican Republic: Ratio of labour costs to
employment in the export processing zones
Source: Mortimore, Duthoo and Guerrero, 1995, p. 26.
tional currency in the Dominican Republic in 1985
the relative wage costs there declined from the
equivalent of 12% of those in the United States to a
little over 5%. At the same time employment in the
EPZs exploded from less than 40,000 to about
150,000 in 1993. The lower wage rates (measured in
dollars) resulting from the huge devaluation in 1985
(itself related to the external debt crisis) explain more
than any other single factor why EPZs took off be-
tween 1986 and 1993. For example, the number of
EPZs in the Dominican Republic grew from 8 to 30,
the number of companies installed in them jumped
from 168 to 447, the gross value of exports shot up
from US$246.2 to US$1,250 millions, and the value
of net foreign exchange earnings from those zones
soared from US$88.4 to US$368.5 million  (Reyes
and Domínguez, 1993). This was a very significant
factor in the recuperation of the economy of the Do-
minican Republic, since its other exports (mostly
natural  resources) had entered  into  a secular nose
dive, falling from about US$900 million in 1984 to
only about US$500 million in 1993, while those from
the EPZs rocketed from US$200 to about US$1,250
million  over  the same period  (Mortimore, Duthoo
and Guerrero, 1995).
Thus, the example of the Dominican Republic
poignantly captures the relationship between the spe-
cial access to the United States market, the use of
EPZs and the low wages which characterize the Carib-
bean Basin variant, and its wildly increased exports
of apparel to the United States market. Unfortunately,
this variant also has its costs.
V
The down side of the special
access-EPZ-low wage variant
in the Caribbean Basin
Each one of the components of the Caribbean Basin
variant for apparel exports to the United States suf-
fers from severe deficiencies as regards its ability to
help these small countries to “make it” into the win-
ners’ circle.
First, special access represents a direct challenge
to the national industrialization process. The very na-
ture of the HTS 9802 mechanism penalizes practically
all value added outside of the United States. This
limits its use to activities in which low wages are
prominent (and compensate for the United States
duty on value added) and in which local physical
inputs are neither needed nor desired by the manufac-
turer or buyer. It is extremely difficult for the national
government of the assembling country to implement
policies that effectively promote greater local integra-
tion of the industry. That is the case for both higher-
level training of the workforce, which would
eventually command higher wages for more skilled
and complex work, and for the incorporation of local
suppliers of inputs such as thread and buttons: let
alone major inputs such as cloth or cutting opera-
tions. Thus, the HTS 9802 mechanism tends to trun-
cate the industrialization process itself, making use
only of the assembly operation in the Caribbean Ba-
sin, to the detriment of any integrated national indus-
trialization process in the assembly country.
Another weak point in the special-access rela-
tionship between the Caribbean Basin and the United
States market has to do with what are known as
“calls” in United States legislation. A United States
firm which feels that it has been unduly affected by
what might be considered an abnormal increase in
imports into the United States can request a decision
by the  United  States Department of  Commerce to
determine if import disruption has taken place. The
Department of Commerce can issue “calls” (warn-
ings) to the local textile offices that allocate quotas in
exporting countries in order to restrain the growth of
such items. This occurred, for example, in March of
1995 when calls were issued to Caribbean Basin pro-
ducers of underwear and pyjamas (some of the more
important apparel exports of the region). While most
assemblers of these items bowed to the United States
demands, Costa Rica –which was one of the coun-
tries hardest hit by this measure– took the case to the
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World Trade Organization and won, although the
damage done to Costa Rican underwear and pyjama
exports was not compensated. In this sense, special
access is sometimes less special than it appears for
the countries involved.
Another problem associated with special access
is that some assembly countries become more special
than others. For example, the implementation of the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in
1994  effectively gave  Mexico  advantages that  the
Caribbean Basin countries did not possess. Mexico
enjoyed a six point tariff rate advantage in the United
States market, was no longer subject to import quotas
on many apparel items and, most notably, could
count Mexican inputs as part of the requisite NAFTA
content, thus   giving it a huge advantage over the
Caribbean Basin countries. For that reason, since the
inception of NAFTA the apparel assemblers of the
Caribbean Basin have been lobbying the United
States Congress in search of “NAFTA parity” for their
apparel exports. Thus, not all assemblers are special
in the same way.
There are also deficiencies in respect of the ex-
port processing zone mechanism, which is the local
counterpart to the HTS 9802 mechanism. The intense
interest of Caribbean Basin countries in developing
new exports in the context of the debt crisis of the
1980s and the structural decline of natural resource
exports led them to enter into “incentives wars” for
foreign direct investment (Mortimore and Peres,
1997). This competition was so severe that the level
of incentives granted came to signify that huge as-
sembly  operations accounting for 40% or more of
these countries’ whole exports to the United States
provided virtually no fiscal income for the local gov-
ernment. Moreover, as a result of competitive pres-
sures, incentives which were intended to be
temporary (8-12 years) became renewable and, in
practice, endless. Thus, in the heat of the battle to
attract FDI to local EPZs, many governments give
away as incentives virtually all of the potential fiscal
income that could be derived from such activities.
These lost resources could   have been used to
strengthen  the  local industrialization process or to
promote other exports or improve the international
competitiveness of the national economy through in-
vestments in infrastructure (ports, airports, roads) and
basic (electricity, water) and other services (telecom-
munications, financial services, etc.). Rather than
representing a starting point for many industries, as
was the case for some of the East Asian NICs, EPZs
became an end in themselves that eventually came to
limit and distort the nascent industrialization process
of many of these Latin American countries.
Finally, the low-wage element of the Caribbean
Basin variant of apparel exports to the United States
has also demonstrated very significant deficiencies.
More than ten years after the massive national cur-
rency devaluations of the 1980s, the labour costs (in-
cluding social and fringe benefits) in the apparel
industry of the Caribbean Basin countries have been
rising steadily (measured in dollars). This translates
into pricing many of their apparel assembly opera-
tions out of the market, without any real manifesta-
tion of industrial upgrading or specialization in
higher-value output. Table 4 presents labour cost data
for forty apparel  producers during 1990-1995, or-
dered from highest (Switzerland, Japan and Germany
had hourly labour  costs over US$ 20 in 1995) to
lowest (five Asian countries, including China, had
hourly labour costs of under US$ 0.30 in the same
year). The Caribbean Basin countries are generally in
the middle of the pack (ranging from positions 13 to
24). All of the Caribbean Basin countries had signifi-
cant increases in their hourly labour costs during
1990-1995: Costa Rica’s costs went up from
US$ 1.09 to US$ 2.23; Jamaica, from US$ 0.91 to
US$ 1.55; El Salvador, from US$ 0.69 to US$ 1.43;
and Guatemala, from US$ 0.45 to US$ 1.30. In other
words, labour costs in the Caribbean Basin are in-
creasing faster than in most other areas and are sub-
stantially higher than many of the assemblers of
standard apparel in Asia. Even within the Caribbean
Basin, there is a considerable distance between
higher cost Costa Rica and lower cost Guatemala.
This suggests that as the level of competition in this
industry increases in keeping with the demise of the
Multifibre Agreement perhaps these countries may be
tempted to follow a strategy of competitive devalu-
ations of their national currencies in order to artifi-
cially prolong the life of their apparel exports. But
that would only make matters worse.
A more fundamental concern is that the current
Caribbean Basin variant of exporting apparel to the
United States market simply does not meet the re-
quirements of the stylized view of the growth of
countries presented in  Section  I. It is evident that
apparel assembly in the Caribbean Basin resulted in
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an impressive explosion of apparel exports. However,
given the characteristics of the particular way this
was achieved, this phenomenon did not represent an
intensification of the national industrialization proc-
esses (on the contrary, it truncated them). These ex-
ports do not represent the extension of the national
apparel  industry into the international market, but
simply the localization of the assembly function it-
self. As a consequence, this process does not create
national leader companies. There is no transformation
of the industry such that the assembler country ex-
tends its industrialization into the more technologi-
cally complex or more fashion-centric aspects of the
apparel industry.
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TABLE 4
Labour costs in the apparel industry, 1990-1995
Hourly costs in US$ a 1990-1995
Rank Country annual growth
rate (%)
1990 1993 1995
1 Switzerland 14.19 18.08 22.42 9.6
2 Japan 6.34 10.64 20.95 27.0
3 Germany 7.23 17.22 20.35 23.0
4 Italy 12.50 12.31 13.68 1.8
5 United States 6.56 8.13 9.62 8.0
6 Spain 7.08 6.41 7.78 1.9
7 Greece 4.33 5.85 7.19 10.7
8 Taiwan 3.41 4.61 5.18 8.7
9 Hong Kong 3.05 3.85 4.32 7.2
10 Singapore 2.43 3.06 4.01 10.5
11 Portugal 2.30 3.03 3.85 10.9
12 South Korea 2.46 2.71 3.29 6.0
13 Costa Rica 1.09 1.08 2.23 15.4
14 Hungary 0.92 1.62 1.68 12.8
15 Mexico 0.92 1.08 1.61 11.8
16 Malaysia 0.56 0.77 1.59 23.2
17 South Africa 1.07 1.12 1.58 8.1
18 Czech Republic 2.79 1.29 1.55 -11.1
19 Jamaica 0.91 0.78 1.55 11.2
20 Turkey 1.35 3.29 1.52 2.4
21 Dominican Republic 0.67 0.63 1.52 17.8
22 El Salvador 0.69 0.63 1.43 15.7
23 Poland 0.50 0.44 1.42 23.2
24 Guatemala 0.45 0.78 1.3 23.6
25 Mauritius ... 1.04 1.28 ...
26 Morocco 0.92 1.06 1.22 5.8
27 Thailand 0.63 0.71 1.11 12.0
28 Philippines 0.46 0.53 0.72 9.4
29 Egypt 0.34 0.43 0.51 8.4
30 Zimbabwe ... 0.35 0.45 ...
31 Sri Lanka 0.24 0.35 0.41 11.3
32 Kenya 0.47 0.23 0.34 -6.3
33 Indonesia 0.16 0.28 0.33 15.6
34 India 0.33 0.27 0.29 -2.6
35 Pakistan 0.24 0.27 0.29 3.9
36 Vietnam ... 0.26 0.29 ...
37 China 0.26 0.25 0.25 -0.8
38 Nigeria 0.2 0.27 0.24 3.7
39 Bangladesh ... 0.16 0.20 ...
40 Tanzania ... 0.18 ... ...
Source: Werner International, Apparel Hourly Labor Cost, New York, 1996, cited in Lall and Mortimore, 1997.
a Costs include social and fringe benefits.
VI
The example of Costa Rica
Costa Rica’s apparel exports to the United States
market increased steadily until 1995, when they de-
clined by over 7%, falling from US$ 776.3 million in
that year to US$ 710.0 million in 1996 (United States
International Trade Commission, 1997b). Costa Rica
saw its apparel exports decline in four of the five
principal apparel categories (at three digits of the
Harmonized Tariff System) that together accounted
for over half such exports:
• HTS 347 - cotton men’s trousers (from US$ 156.6
to US$ 148.2 million),
• HTS 352 - cotton underwear (from US$ 112.2 to
US$ 77.1 million),
• HTS 649 - synthetic fibre brassières (from US$ 84.7
to US$ 60.4 million), and
• HTS 338 - synthetic fibre underwear (from US$ 51.5
to US$ 45.3 million).
The Costa Rican apparel industry apparently had
developed wrinkles.
A detailed analysis of ten of the principal export
items of this industry in 1994 (at six digits of the
HTS) revealed that by 1996 each item had lost import
market shares, on average by 23.6%.5 While Latin
American countries were winning United States im-
port market shares for these same items, Costa Rica
was losing out, primarily to Mexico and Central
American countries such as Honduras, El Salvador
and Guatemala, but not to the Dominican Republic.
Was Costa Rica being priced out of the market? An
in-depth study of the international competitiveness of
the Costa Rican apparel industry was carried out to
respond to that concern (Mortimore and Zamora,
1998). A formal questionnaire was administered to
16 firms in the sector, and the information from the
interviews and analysis of results of the questionnaire
threw light on the specific competitive situations of
these enterprises.
The sixteen firms could be classified into three
different groups:
Group I: Very large subsidiaries of United States
TNCs assembling undergarments for export to the
United States market via HTS 9802, which faced
“calls” in 1995 after having improved their interna-
tional market shares considerably during 1990-1995.
They accounted for the lion’s share of Costa Rica’s
apparel exports to the United States. An indicator of
their success, aside from their domination of Costa
Rican clothing exports, is that their employment dou-
bled between 1985 and 1990 and doubled again be-
tween 1990 and 1995. Examples are the subsidiaries
of large United States branded manufacturers such as
Hanes (Sara Lee), Warnaco and Lovable.
Group II: Other, mostly new, foreign subsidiaries
which mainly assemble clothing subject to quotas in
the United States market, which they access via HTS
9802, and which had a less successful performance in
general during 1990-1995. This group accounts for
an appreciable portion of the remaining Costa Rican
clothing exports and its employment levels rose by
50% between 1985 and 1990 and by about 40% be-
tween 1990 and 1995. They employ fewer personnel
than the companies in Group I and are also less dy-
namic. Examples are the subsidiaries of United States
firms such as Tropical Sportswear, Cluett Peabody,
Todd Uniform and Gilmour Trading.
Group III: Old-established national firms, mostly
small ones using the export contract regime which
accessed the United States market via non-HTS
mechanisms and have had some success in improving
their international market shares. Their exports are
not significant in the context of the Costa Rican
clothing industry. While the employment of these
companies doubled between 1985 and 1990, it fell by
one-third  between 1990 and 1995. Their domestic
market shares have been collapsing due to increased
import competition. Examples include the Cia. Textil
Centroamericana, El Acorazado, Tejidos El Aguila,
etc.
Given their different competitive situations,
these companies also had different corporate strate-
gies. Group I firms, which possessed more sophisti-
cated, specialized operations in which quality is
extremely important, had set up integrated regional
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5 Calculated using the MAGIC computer programme, which
measures international competitiveness in terms of import mar-
ket shares in the United States market at up to 10 digits of the
HTS. Available from the ECLAC Subregional Headquarters in
Mexico. Contact rbuitela@un.org.mx.
production systems in the Caribbean Basin some time
ago. Typically, they had subsidiaries in 4 or 5 differ-
ent sites, such as the Dominican Republic, Jamaica,
Honduras, El Salvador and Mexico, as well as Costa
Rica. In this fashion, they could adapt to changing
national competitive situations (labour costs, ex-
change rate variations, and other changed circum-
stances) by adding/dropping lines of production in
particular sites. They had no need to be “footloose”.
Generally they assembled apparel products for their
headquarters firm which sold the output to retailers in
the United States market. Their success in Costa Rica
allowed them to  implement “expansive”  strategies
until the 1995 “calls” were made.
Group II enterprises had less sophisticated, less
specialized operations, and wages rather than quality
was considered to be the principal element in their
international competitiveness. In this sense they had
more of a strict “cost centre” mentality. They tended
to have much smaller corporate networks in the Car-
ibbean, based on only 1 or 2 main sites. They were
more “footloose” and prone to adapt to changing na-
tional competitive situations by moving away when
the going got rough. Rather than producing for their
headquarters corporation itself, these firms generally
competed for the assembly portion of buyers’ con-
tracts, often delivering  the product directly to the
contractor. Given their more limited success, their
strategies tended to be more neutral than expansive.
Group III companies were the least sophisticated
and least specialized of the three groups. These na-
tional firms considered foreign technology to be the
principal  element of their competitiveness both  in
Costa Rica and in the international market. They pos-
sessed no international corporate network to speak of
and were, effectively, at the mercy of the national
competitive situation. Because of the collapse of their
domestic market shares due to import liberation,
these companies were obliged to compete increas-
ingly for the assembly portion of buyers’ contracts in
the international market in order to survive. Their
strategies can be considered defensive.
The most interesting  finding of  this empirical
study in Costa Rica is that these three different
groups of firms which implemented different corpo-
rate strategies all provided some exceptionally nega-
tive indications of the problems associated with the
special access/export processing zone/low wage for-
mula for exporting apparel to the United States mar-
ket from Costa Rica. For example, one of the parent
firms –a major United States branded manufacturer
owning two of the five large Group I firms in Costa
Rica (and others in the Dominican Republic, Mexico,
and more recently other Central American coun-
tries)– announced that it was to be restructured (sell-
ing off its United States yarn and textile operations).
It would therefore no longer manufacture many of the
goods that it sells. What does that forebode for the
relatively high-cost plants in Costa Rica? Closure?
Sale? Hopefully, it will not follow the example of its
arch-rival, Fruit of the Loom.6 Another example is a
Group I firm which closed one of its three plants in
Costa Rica only to expand activities in neighbouring
Panama. In 1996 a Group II company simply disap-
peared from Costa Rica, leaving behind huge out-
standing liabilities, especially in respect of wages and
social security payments. Workers claimed that there
was no advance warning of this “fly-by-night” exit
over the weekend. Will more follow this example as
Costa Rica’s international competitiveness in this in-
dustry wanes? A final example has to do with a
Group III enterprise. In 1996 one of the four national
companies, owned by a prominent local businessman
(then President of the National Manufacturers’ Asso-
ciation), that attempted to survive by competing for
export assembly contracts simply went broke due to
the increasing competitive pressures.
What does all this mean? At the very least, it
would seem to suggest that the problems of apparel
exports via the special access/export processing
zone/low wage mechanism would appear to be sys-
temic. They do not relate to any particular kind of
firm with any particular corporate strategy: rather, all
apparel firms see their international competitiveness
crumble. If one were to prepare a kind of Costa Rican
scorecard on the capacity for the apparel industry to
propel the country towards “the winners’ circle”
mentioned in Section I, some interesting conclusions
can be drawn about this experience. First, in terms of
intensifying the national industrialization process, the
reliance on  the HTS 9802  mechanism does indeed
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6 Fruit of the Loom has been imploding: laying off 16,355 of its
29,112 United  States  workers  since 1994, suffering  operating
losses of US$ 283 million in 1997, and provoking complaints of
poor service from key clients, such as Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and
Kmart Corp. The solution proposed by its CEO is to move its
domicile to the Cayman Islands to save on taxes. See Business
Week, 1998, pp. 50-54.
truncate the national industrialization process in re-
spect of apparel. Only the assembly stage is located
in the country and, aside from labour, no significant
local inputs are incorporated into the final products.
Moreover, the tax incentives for the export process-
ing zones so limit the fiscal income received by the
State from this central export activity that it cannot be
said to provide resources for other urgent activities,
which include stimulating the national industrializa-
tion process, promoting new exports, and improving
the international competitiveness of the economy as
a whole through the development of infrastructure,
basic services, or indeed the training of human re-
sources for more sophisticated and better-remuner-
ated tasks.
Second, as regards extending the national indus-
trialization process into the international market by
way of exports of manufactures, it is abundantly clear
that these apparel exports are not linked to the na-
tional economy in any integral way. These exports
are “competitive” only in the United States market,
and they cannot be directed to other markets when
problems arise in that one, such as the “calls” on
pyjamas and underwear in March 1995. In the par-
ticular case of Costa Rica, one could go so far as to
say that the WTO dispute proved that the United
States can be an extremely unpleasant trading partner
when its nose is tweaked in international fora.
Finally, does the apparel industry in Costa Rica
create  leading national  companies that evolve into
major players in international markets? On the con-
trary, the opposite took place when the opening up of
the economy gave rise to competition from imports
that destroyed most of the ISI-based integrated opera-
tions of national firms. These firms do not possess a
Caribbean network of assembly operations, thus they
grow or decline in keeping with the evolution of the
international competitiveness of the Costa Rican
economy. Even their ability to compete for buyers’
contracts is severely limited by the size and charac-
teristics of the local economy, let alone their ability to
manufacture (rather than assemble) apparel. They
have a hard time surviving.
So, what makes apparel-based industrialization
in the Caribbean Basin such a “threadbare garment”?
It takes place by way of a mechanism that is de-
signed exclusively to make United States apparel
firms more competitive in their own market (by tak-
ing advantage of low wages in the Caribbean). What
is needed is one that explicitly and consciously aims
at raising the long-term growth of the host econo-
mies, and especially at achieving the sustained rise in
per capita income that will place them in the winners’
circle.
Instead of deepening national industrialization it
truncates it.
Instead of producing exports that represent the in-
ternational extension of the industrialization process,
it represents the simple assembly of foreign compo-
nents, which is no more than a potential starting point
for industrial activities.
Instead of giving birth to national companies
which evolve into global competitors it threatens
their very existence.
Clearly, when an activity which generates a ma-
jor part of a country’s exports does not serve to raise
that economy to a higher level, closer to the goal of
significant and sustained per capita income growth
achieved by the winner countries, then apparel-based
industrialization can justly be said to have become a
“threadbare garment”.
Dire consequences are foreseen for those apparel
exporters that do not possess a local industrialization
process when the Multifibre Arrangement comes to
an end in 2005 under the terms of the Textile and
Clothing Agreement of the Uruguay Round of GATT,
for that is when the quotas placed on apparel by the
United States and other countries are to be termi-
nated. Caribbean apparel assemblers will face a diffi-
cult task to compete in the United States (or other
markets) against the integrated apparel producers of
East Asia. The latter produce textiles and apparel at
scales of production far beyond the reach of the trun-
cated Caribbean  operations. Lacking a competitive
local or subregional industrialization process to sus-
tain apparel exports, most Caribbean operations will
probably collapse in the face of the Asian steamroller.
In the few years remaining before that happens,
the Caribbean Basin apparel industry can attempt to
improve its situation. It must continue to insist on
NAFTA parity in the North American market so that
national or subregional local inputs can count as
NAFTA inputs and thereby promote some degree of
industrial integration. It must look for opportunities
for associating in some way with the full package
suppliers appearing in Mexico as a consequence of
NAFTA. Finally, it must learn from the East Asian
experience itself in terms of becoming full package
suppliers. A stitch in time…
(Original: English)
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